We need indicators of progress that would exclude tricks on the part of Ukraine or NATO.


We need indicators of progress that would exclude tricks on the part of Ukraine or NATO.

An important step for Ukraine in maintaining the mobile capability of Allied forces has been its agreement to lease Ukrainian AN-124 aircraft to NATO countries.

In 2003, out of 256 planned activities of the Target Plan, 230 were implemented. Such intensive implementation of the Target Plan was positively assessed by the NATO leadership at the meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Commission.

However, the commission’s meeting also identified shortcomings in Ukraine’s implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan and the NATO-Ukraine Target Plan for 2003. They relate to military components, including insufficient funding, limited skills, military ignorance of the foreign language, and slow formation of civilian structures. Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

The State Program of Training, Retraining and Advanced Training of Specialists in the Field of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine for 2004-2007 and the State Program of Public Information on Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine for 2004-2007, approved by the President of Ukraine on December 2, 2003, are aimed at overcoming these shortcomings. p.

Adoption of the State program of training, retraining and advanced training of specialists in the field of European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine for 2004-2007 is due to the need to create a comprehensive effective system of training highly qualified managers, improving training to develop human resources to ensure state policy in Euro-Atlantic integration. and creating the preconditions for EU and NATO membership.

The state program of informing the public on Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine for 2004-2007 is aimed at raising awareness of Ukrainian citizens about NATO’s Euro-Atlantic integration processes, its development, benefits of membership in this organization, directions, state and prospects of Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO. The program provides a number of measures that should provide an objective assessment of NATO’s activities, highlight its prospects and the benefits that Ukraine will be able to gain from membership in the Alliance.

These large-scale programs are complemented by a number of language training activities and an increase in the number of Armed Forces staff officers in positions in the PfP staff elements provided for under the 2003 Target Action Plan and the 2004 Target Action Plan.

At the same time, both the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan and the annual Target Plans for both 2003 and 2004 have significant methodological shortcomings, as pointed out by James Sherr in particular: "First, it (the Action Plan) does not distinguish between long -term goals. and the goals achievable in the current political and economic situation, and if the latter are not identified, it will be tempting to postpone all issues to the future instead of focusing on areas where progress can and should be made. implementations are mechanical, and indicators of progress are needed that would eliminate tricks on the part of Ukraine or NATO.

We are talking here primarily about such clear parameters of implementation of measures as time, scope, content, responsible performers, efficiency. Outlining these parameters would allow for clear monitoring of their implementation and evaluation of their effectiveness.

The vast majority of measures are formulated very abstractly, which makes it impossible to give an objective assessment of what has been achieved and gives grounds to speak about the declarativeness of the stated goals and measures. The objectives of the Action Plan and the measures of the target plans are not balanced with the real possibilities of their implementation. Priority, long-term and short-term goals have not been defined.

Such abstractness, declarativeness and vagueness of goals and measures deprive the criteria of assessing what Ukraine has made on the path to NATO, in which directions there are no changes and where the situation has significantly deteriorated compared to the previous one.

If we analyze the NATO-Ukraine Target Plan for 2003 from this point of view, it turns out that the most advanced areas of NATO requirements are foreign and security policy, cooperation with NATO and legal issues.

In the field of foreign and security policy, the Concept of National Security was updated to take into account Ukraine’s future membership in NATO, a number of projects and proposals for amendments to Ukrainian security and foreign policy laws were prepared, and a system of practical mechanisms for cooperation with NATO was developed. and implement strategic program documents and measures at the national level.

At the same time, there are almost no significant changes in such areas as economic and information issues, reform in the defense and security sector. But the worst thing is that there is a significant departure from NATO’s requirements in areas such as domestic and resource issues.

The situation with freedom of the press and other mass media has deteriorated, and the electoral system and the electoral process in Ukraine are of great concern to international organizations, in particular the issues of its transparency and democracy, as well as the protection of civil liberties … It is these domestic political issues that are key to the Alliance, crucial to inviting a country to join.

Therefore, in order to become a member of NATO, it is first necessary to change the conceptual approaches in Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration strategy.

These new conceptual approaches should be based on the following principles:

1. The primary goal in relations with the https://123helpme.me/ethan-frome/ Alliance should be Ukraine’s accession to NATO, and not long-term Euro-Atlantic integration with an uncertain perspective, which does not oblige any specific party. Based on this priority, it is necessary to move away from the philosophy of "special partnership" or "deep cooperation", which in the new historical framework of today has already exhausted itself. This formula of relations should be changed to relations, the main purpose of which will be Ukraine’s membership in NATO.

2. In accordance with this goal, it is necessary to revise all guiding documents governing the implementation of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration policy. This applies in particular to the NATO-Ukraine Target Plan for 2004.

It, like the analytical Target Plan for 2003, repeats the structure of the MAP, but in its content lacks too much abstractness, a mechanical set of goals without determining their priority, chaotic replenishment of measures that are not always subject to the main goal – Ukraine’s accession to NATO.

Thus, of the whole set of goals and activities, only goal II. And I. "Reform of the Armed Forces" (in the subsection "Reform in the field of security and defense") was renewed by more or less specific measures that meet the main goal. All other content of the Action Plan has been renewed by national measures, which are not related at all to Ukraine’s acquisition of NATO membership or are indirectly related. Therefore, the fallacy of such a methodological approach can be corrected by selecting goals in accordance with the main goal.

Defining short- and medium-term goals that would best meet the main goal of joining NATO.

In the short term, these goals should ensure Ukraine’s candidate status for NATO membership. This requires, first, NATO’s trust in Ukraine in its commitment to Euro-Atlantic values ​​and its intention to become a member of the Alliance, and second, its ability to make a real contribution to collective defense, peacekeeping and other new Allied missions … In accordance with these two requirements, it is necessary to develop an appropriate tree of goals to be achieved.

The medium-term perspective should include a set of goals that would allow the legal stage of NATO membership to be successfully completed. In contrast to the short-term, mainly related to the military and political-diplomatic plane, the medium-term goals include the transformation of the socio-political, economic, spiritual sphere of society and the country as a whole. Such goals cannot be achieved in the short term, as they involve deeper progress, bringing not only the Armed Forces but the country as a whole closer to Alliance standards.

In the military and political spheres, this means the acquisition of common thinking and a common strategic culture, incompatible with the old Soviet stereotype. The realization of such a goal is a process of liberation from post-Sovietism (in its totalitarian sense) in approaches to the principles of governing the country, worldviews and political values. Of course, this process is quite long. What needs to be done to achieve this goal? First of all, a number of measures should be developed according to the following third principle.

Compliance of measures with the declared short-term and medium-term goals. The analysis of the measures contained in the NATO-Ukraine Target Plan for 2004 shows significant shortcomings in the methodology of their selection. Too much abstract wording does not make it possible to assess the relevance of these measures to the goals to which they are aimed. Moreover, in this case the criterion for assessing their implementation and effectiveness is lost.

For example, such formulations as "improvement of normative-legal regulation of the procedure of realization of the constitutional right of citizens" or "improvement of the structure and activity of state bodies in the field of prevention of money laundering" or "promotion of laws necessary to ensure Ukraine’s accession to the WTO "they do not commit to anything specific and it is extremely difficult to assess their effectiveness or level of implementation.

Some of the measures included in the 2004 Target Plan do not fall within the scope of Euro-Atlantic integration at all, such as "the development and adoption of regulations in the field of standardization in order to minimize the possible negative consequences of EU enlargement for Ukrainian exporters. "

Such examples show that the measures provided for in the 2004 Target Plan are largelyvague, unfocused, ineffective. In their content, they have little effect on the realization of the goal. Therefore, the selection and formulation of measures should be carried out in accordance with the relevant requirements.

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